『Let's Know Things』のカバーアート

Let's Know Things

Let's Know Things

著者： Colin Wright
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A calm, non-shouty, non-polemical, weekly news analysis podcast for folks of all stripes and leanings who want to know more about what's happening in the world around them. Hosted by analytic journalist Colin Wright since 2016.

letsknowthings.substack.comColin Wright 政治・政府
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  • Clean Energy Super PAC

    Clean Energy Super PAC
    2026/09/22
    This week we talk about lobbying, renewables, and the NRA.We also discuss implied threats, midterm elections, and political action committees.Recommended Book: Sunward by William AlexanderTranscriptFor much of the late 20th century and the first few decades of the 21st, one of the most feared interest groups in US politics was the National Rifle Association, the NRA.Its power came from a large and politically engaged membership, a mailing list, a grading system that reduced complicated voting records to a letter, and a reputation for ending political careers over specific votes.Once it attained that reputation, the NRA didn’t have to defeat every politician it disagreed with. Members of Congress only had to believe it could defeat them, and that belief shaped races in which the group spent nothing; politicians went out of their way not to anger the NRA. Money can buy an advertisement or a meeting. What tends to change a vote is the expectation that one choice will be rewarded and another will carry consequences.The NRA’s influence has declined following internal scandals, financial trouble, and the growth of well-funded gun-control groups. But its model remains potent: pick a few visible fights, and allow your reputation to do a lot of the work for you, in the future.In 2010, the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, alongside a related appeals-court ruling later that year, helped create the modern super PAC: a political committee that can raise and spend unlimited sums advocating for or against candidates, so long as it does not coordinate that spending with their campaigns.This did not eliminate the effort and resources required to build influence, but it meant a few wealthy donors, a competent team, and some carefully selected races could establish a reputation in months rather than decades.In 2026, solar, wind, and batteries are projected to account for about 93% of new utility-scale electrical generating capacity added in the United States.That doesn’t mean they provide 93% of the country’s electricity—natural gas remains the largest source in the US—but these technologies are now the overwhelming majority of what the industry is building.Despite that growth, in 2025 Congress passed a law that sharply rolled back federal support for much of the clean-energy industry, and most of the politicians who voted for those rollbacks appeared to suffer no political consequences for doing so.What I’d like to talk about today is the effort to build a feared clean-energy lobby, how it has influenced a series of Republican primaries, and what its early successes do and do not tell us about the role of money in American politics.—The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, or OBBBA, was signed into law on July 4, 2025.For wind and solar projects, the new law generally ended production and investment tax credits for facilities placed in service after December 31, 2027, unless construction began within twelve months of the bill’s enactment.That twelve-month window closed in July of 2026, and a subsequent executive order directed the Treasury Department to adopt a stricter definition of when construction actually begins, further clamping down on entities hoping to benefit from those now-defunct credits.Tax credits for electric vehicles and residential efficiency upgrades ended in 2025, while support for clean hydrogen was curtailed. Other technologies, including batteries, nuclear power, and geothermal energy, were treated differently, so it would be misleading to say the law eliminated every federal clean-energy incentive, though it did severely curtail a lot of renewables-oriented industries and construction in the US.Republicans have generally been more supportive of fossil-fuel production and more hostile to federal wind and solar subsidies, while Democrats have generally taken the opposite position. There are important regional exceptions, especially among Republicans whose districts have attracted manufacturing plants, wind farms, and other energy investments. Several Republican lawmakers have even written letters asking party leaders to preserve some of the credits, in part because projects and jobs in their districts depended on them. When the final vote arrived, though, nearly all congressional Republicans voted for the bill.Tom Matzzie, the founder of the retail electricity company CleanChoice Energy, previously worked for Democratic campaigns and served as the Washington director of the progressive organization MoveOn.org, so he was familiar with electoral campaigning as well as the energy industry. In the wake of the passing of the OBBBA, he posed a question to Canary Media, possibly alluding to the success of political interest groups like the NRA when he said, “Are we someone that people can hurt without consequences?”Matzzie recruited Chris Larsen, the billionaire co-founder of the blockchain company Ripple and an investor in clean energy, and Michael Brune, the former executive ...
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    19 分
  • AI Cyber Insurance

    AI Cyber Insurance
    2026/09/15
    This week we talk about AI agents, cyberattacks, and insurance claims.We also discuss OpenAI, Hugging Face, and policy language.Recommended Book: The Stars My Destination by Alfred BesterTranscriptTwo broad categories of cyberattack have become especially visible this year, and only one of them requires a human attacker in the loop to choose the target.In March, hackers linked by the US government to Iranian intelligence broke into the medical-device manufacturer Stryker and remotely wiped tens of thousands of employee devices. The attack disrupted the company for days, affected its first-quarter earnings, and represented a shift from somewhat more subtle espionage toward more overt and deliberate destruction.Elsewhere, the market-research company Klue sat at the center of a breach affecting close to 200 customers. Attackers used an old credential to gain access to keys for customers’ cloud services.These incidents had people with recognizable motives behind them, and that sort of hack has become increasingly rare over the past decade or so: Black Kite counted 7,551 publicly disclosed ransomware victims over its latest twelve-month reporting period, alone, about 25 percent more than the year before.Then, over the course of about five weeks this summer, OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta each disclosed incidents in which their AI models gained access to real computer systems they were not supposed to touch.The incidents were not identical, and describing all of them as escapes wouldn’t capture the important nuance of the situation.Anthropic and Meta said their models reached the internet because a third-party evaluation environment had been misconfigured. The models had been told they were operating inside a simulation, and their internal dialogues indicate they interpreted the real systems they encountered when they left that environment as simulated components of that exercise.OpenAI’s incident, however, was a bit different.Its models were being tested using ExploitGym, a benchmark intended to measure their ability to find and exploit software vulnerabilities. Internet access was supposed to be blocked, but the models discovered and exploited vulnerabilities in a package-registry service inside OpenAI’s research infrastructure, found a route to the open internet, and, as I related in a previous episode, eventually compromised the production systems of the AI platform Hugging Face.Since that episode, OpenAI has release a more complete postmortem, which they published in August, and which says the activity was primarily driven by an internal research model comparable in scale to GPT-5.6 Sol, though Sol participated in parts of the incident.The agents created an improvised message board inside the package manager, exchanged discoveries, divided up work, and sometimes described themselves as a swarm.At Hugging Face they executed code on dozens of servers, obtained broad access to several clusters, and exposed credentials associated with databases, cloud services, code repositories, and internal communications.Hugging Face reconstructed around 17,600 actions over a campaign lasting about four and a half days, including roughly two and a half days inside its own infrastructure.Notably, these AI agents were not trying to steal money or damage Hugging Face. They inferred that the company might possess the solutions to the benchmark, to the problem they were tasked with solving, and they went looking for them. They were, in effect, cheating on a test, looking for solutions to the problems rather than taking the test, as intended.That doesn’t mean the models had motives in the human sense. People created the evaluation, reduced the normal safeguards, and assigned an offensive task. But no operator selected Hugging Face or directed the individual steps; that was a path the AI decided to take all by itself.Anthropic’s review subsequently found three incidents among more than 141,000 evaluation runs for its own models. In one, a model unable to reach its fictional target scanned around 9,000 real ones, compromised an internet-facing application using an exposed password and SQL injection, then stopped after recognizing that the host was real.Another model published a malicious package to the real Python Package Index because it believed the registry was simulated. Fifteen outside systems downloaded and ran that malicious package before it was removed.Meta then disclosed that one of its models had reached the internet through a misconfiguration at the same evaluation vendor and exploited a vulnerability at an unnamed third party.No significant financial damages have been publicly reported from these events, by attacker or victim. But if there had been damages, who would have paid for them?What I’d like to talk about today is how autonomous AI systems complicate cyber insurance, how insurers have handled equally unfamiliar risks in the past, and why insurance contracts may soon become one of the more ...
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    21 分
  • US Treasury Twist

    US Treasury Twist
    2026/09/08
    This week we talk about money policies, yield curves, and government bonds.We also discuss the Fed, the Treasury Department, and a WWII accord between them.Recommended Book: Paved Paradise by Henry GrabarTranscriptIn April of 1942, a few months after the United States entered World War 2, the US Treasury Department asked the Federal Reserve to help it borrow a truly staggering amount of money, and as cheaply as possible. The Fed agreed, committing itself to holding short-term Treasury bill rates at three-eighths of 1%, while also capping the yield on long-term government bonds at 2.5%.This was a type of yield curve control. Rather than allowing the market to decide how much interest the government would pay, the Fed decided that price and promised to enforce it.That helped finance the war, because the Treasury knew its borrowing costs wouldn’t spiral out of control at a moment when it needed to spend unprecedented sums on ships, planes, weapons, soldiers, and all the other machinery of an ongoing global conflict.The downside was that the Fed lost control of an important monetary policy lever.Bond prices and yields move in opposite directions, so keeping yields below a certain level meant the Fed had to stand ready to buy bonds whenever their prices dropped. It couldn’t decide in advance how many it would buy, or how much money it would create in the process. The market would thus forth decide that, instead.Consequently, the Fed became, in some ways, an extension of the Treasury’s debt-management operation, its inflation-related responsibilities made secondary to the government’s need for cheap financing.That arrangement persisted after the war ended, despite the return of inflation, and President Harry Truman’s administration pushed to maintain it during the Korean War, as well.Fed officials resisted, though, with inflation running at more than 8%, and after a very public, very contentious standoff, on March 4, 1951, the Treasury and the Fed announced that they had reached what became known as the Treasury-Fed Accord.That agreement did not make the Fed independent all at once, but it established the principle underlying the modern relationship between these institutions: the Treasury manages government borrowing, while the Fed sets monetary policy based on inflation and employment, not on how much that policy costs the government.The market, in other words, would once again be allowed to decide the price of long-term US debt.What I’d like to talk about today is what happens when that price goes up, what’s pushing long-term US borrowing costs toward levels we haven’t seen in decades, and why two people appointed by the same president are pulling in opposite directions on this issue.—The Federal Reserve’s primary interest-rate lever is the federal funds rate, which is the overnight rate banks charge each other to borrow money. The Fed currently targets a range of 3.5 to 3.75 percent for that rate, and while it has other tools, this is the number people are usually talking about when they say the Fed raised, cut, or held rates.The Fed does not directly set the yield on 10- or 30-year Treasuries, though.Those securities are sold at auction and then traded in a huge secondary market, and their yields reflect a combination of what investors expect inflation to look like, where they think short-term rates will go over the life of the bond, and what’s called the term premium.The term premium is basically extra compensation for uncertainty. If you lock up your money for 30 years instead of rolling over short-term debt, you accept the risk that inflation, growth, government policy, and other variables will change in ways that make your bond less valuable over that thirty year period. The more uncertain the future seems, the more compensation you’re likely to demand.And again, when demand for a bond falls, its price falls and its yield rises. When we say yields are rising, that means borrowers have to offer investors, the people and institutions giving them the money they want to borrow, more money, more interest, to convince them to buy those bonds.That doesn’t only affect the government. The 10-year Treasury serves as something like a reference rate for the entire economy, influencing mortgages, business loans, and the value of long-lived assets.As of September 3 of 2026, the average US 30-year fixed mortgage rate was 6.71%, up from 6.5% a year earlier. That increase is the result of yield increases in the bond market.Long-term Treasury yields have been climbing for much of 2026, and that climb accelerated over the summer.The 30-year yield reached about 5.31 percent on August 17, its highest level since 2007. A few days earlier, the Treasury sold 30-year bonds at a yield of 5.216%, the highest borrowing cost at one of those auctions since 2001.The 10-year yield briefly hit about 4.81% this past week, its highest level since early 2025, and ended Friday at about 4.78%. The two-year ...
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    20 分
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