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Lincoln Cannon

Lincoln Cannon

著者： Lincoln Cannon
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 Lincoln Cannon is a technologist and philosopher, and leading voice of Mormon Transhumanism.2025 Lincoln Cannon スピリチュアリティ
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  • Vazza Overstates Constraints on the Simulation

    Vazza Overstates Constraints on the Simulation
    2025/05/28
    Most of us first encounter the Simulation Hypothesis through science fiction, often experienced as something of a metaphysical thrill-ride. But as computational theory and cosmology advance, serious thinkers – philosophers like Nick Bostrom, physicists, computer scientists, and even theologians – have begun analyzing the feasibility of computed worlds. Recently, Franco Vazza published “ Astrophysical constraints on the simulation hypothesis for this Universe: why it is (nearly) impossible that we live in a simulation.” In this paper, he provides a scientific analysis of the Simulation Hypothesis. Vazza’s analysis is impressive in both scope and detail. He incorporates influential contemporary hypotheses about the relationship between information, energy, and the structural constraints of our universe. These include the Holographic Principle, Landauer’s limit, and astrophysical energy bounds. From them, Vazza reasons that any simulation of our universe (even on reduced scales) would require astronomically large amounts of energy. So large, he judges from his calculations, the energy requirements would be greater than anything feasible within our universe. Not even black holes instrumented as computers, at what he deems to be the bounds of theoretical speculation, could handle the demands of a low-resolution real-time simulation. Thus, he concludes, energy requirements render the Simulation Hypothesis practically impossible for any simulator that may operate within physics like our own. Of course he doesn’t know about physics unlike our own, which he admits. But he points out, rightly, the practical triviality of speculation about physics unlike our own. The more alien the imagined physics, the less such imagination implies anything meaningful about our own potential. So alternative physics can’t save the Simulation Hypothesis. Although I’m not expert in the related physics, I assume Vazza has accurately characterized the scientific hypotheses on which he calls. And although I haven’t carefully reviewed his logic and math, I assume they are valid and correct. However, even granting those particular assumptions, a model is only as strong as the ensemble of its assumptions. As much as I appreciate Vazza’s audacity, I find his conclusion overstated and his apparent confidence unwarranted. He overlooks or glosses over foundational assumptions that deserve more attention. It’s premature to declare the Simulation Hypothesis “impossible,” or even nearly so. Overestimating Costs Perhaps the greatest overreach arises from assumptions that Vazza uses to calculate energy requirements. He acknowledges the Simulation Hypothesis doesn’t depend on simulating an entire universe, or even an entire planet at full resolution, although he focuses considerable attention on such ideas. And he does briefly consider the possibility of solipsism. But he stops short of fully considering minimal costs for supporting subjective experience. Consciousness is not well understood by science or philosophy. Mind may emerge from or supervene on relatively coarse substrate, which resists easy quantification. We cannot say, at least for now, what a minimum necessary substrate for experience would be. But we can say, with the confidence of speaking from definition, that a simulation would need only provide whatever substrate proves sufficient for consistent and convincing experience. To achieve that, a simulation may economize substantially. For example, it could leverage compressed statistical descriptions of substrate that, in turn, feed on-demand minimal-resolution rendering of substrate. Vazza suggests this would still be too costly due to the energy requirements of error correction, which he briefly characterizes in a footnote as being consistent across both irreversible (standard) and reversible computing contexts. However, competing hypotheses suggest that the cost of error correction may be considerably decreased within the context of reversible computing. It’s worth recalling that, in calculations like these, small differences in assumptions can multiply into vast discrepancies between conclusions. We can see this across a diversity of approaches to the Simulation Argument. And that’s to be expected, as we can see this elsewhere. For example, small differences in values assigned to components of the Drake Equation yield wildly different estimates for the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations. Underestimating Superintelligence Central to the Simulation Hypothesis is the idea that the simulators are, compared to us, vastly more intelligent – superintelligent. Vazza’s assessment of energy production possibilities, however, come merely from contemporary observations of transient natural phenomena such as supernovae. What about hypothetical technologies for sustainable energy that humans can already imagine, such as encapsulating stars in Dyson spheres, extracting energy from the rotation of ...
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  • Technological Uniformity Saves the Simulation

    Technological Uniformity Saves the Simulation
    2025/05/07
    Nick Bostrom’s formulation of the Simulation Argument is a rigorous reworking of what is, at its heart, an ancient question. Are we living in a created world? He distills the answer into three stark possibilities, a trilemma: Doom: Almost all civilizations destroy themselves or otherwise fail before developing the capacity to create detailed simulations of their ancestors. Abstinence: Some civilizations develop this technological capacity, but almost all choose not to simulate conscious agents, for ethical or other reasons. Simulation: If our civilization survives and runs ancestor simulations, then simulated agents would vastly outnumber non-simulated agents, and, all else equal, our credence that we’re simulated should be very high. In a critical analysis, Brian Eggleston highlights an unstated assumption underlying Bostrom’s formulation: we are not alone as technological pioneers. Specifically, Bostrom’s trilemma only entails the third possibility, that we’re simulated, if we assume that some other civilization – not only our future descendants – already ran ancestor simulations before our present. Without this assumption, we could imagine humanity as the first or only simulator, collapsing the trilemma into merely weak possibilities without force. Principle of Technological Uniformity However, I believe there’s an unstated intuition, yet another unrecognized assumption, behind Bostrom’s formulation. And that intuition, when identified and formally expressed as an assumption, fully addresses Eggleston’s criticism and maintains the force of the trilemma. I call that assumption the Principle of Technological Uniformity (PTU): If a given technology is feasible, beneficial, and once achieved by a civilization, then, all else equal (barring radically unique physics or values), that technology probably has been or will be achieved by other civilizations operating within similar conditions. PTU has at least three important characteristics. First, it provides rational grounds for supposing that becoming a simulator increases the probability that other simulators exist. Second, it reflects and extends many empirical precedents, including those broadly categorized as convergent evolution. Third, it maintains the strength of Bostrom’s trilemma, solving the problem that Eggleston identifies without appealing to exceptionalism. Philosophical Support PTU is grounded in the principle of mediocrity, or what people sometimes call the “Copernican” principle. As Copernicus removed from Earth the privilege of being the center of our conceptualization of the cosmos, so PTU would have us resist the temptation to privilege our human civilization uniquely in time or space or significance. Instead, given uncertainty and no evidence for our uniqueness, we should regard ourselves as typical. Human civilization on Earth is just one among many technological civilizations, subject to similar physics and incentives. PTU is related to the anthropic principle. When considering the possibility of others developing technology like us, we shouldn’t default to flattering assumptions that would make us exceptional. To the contrary, as we observe ourselves developing increasingly detailed simulations, that should raise our credence that others have developed similar technologies before us. PTU is a meta-induction about technology diffusion, similar to but distinct from the self-sampling assumption. Eggleston’s criticism hinges on the possibility that another civilization has already become a simulator. PTU invites us to assume this possibility has a significant probability, both for the philosophical reasons mentioned above, as well as empirical reasons shared below. We should assume that, where potential and incentive align, scientific discoveries and technological developments propagate, not deterministically, but frequently enough to warrant inductive reasoning from specific observations to generalizations. Empirical Support PTU is not merely a philosophical abstraction. Biological, cultural, and technological evolution are replete with convergence. Life and intelligence within similar constraints repeatedly arrive at similar solutions to similar problems. Biological examples abound. The camera eye, constructed from radically different biological materials, appears to have evolved independently in both cephalopods (ancestors of the octopus) and vertebrates (ancestors of humans). Powered flight apparently evolved independently in insects, birds, and bats, reflecting similar constraints in aerodynamics. Where an environment rewards a particular function, nature finds a way to achieve that function, often more than once. Cultural examples also abound. Agriculture seems to have begun independently on multiple continents, perhaps millennia apart. Writing systems appeared at disparate times in Sumer, Egypt, China, and Mesoamerica with little to no evidence of direct transmission. Even intricate toolmaking, such...
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  • Distorting Transhumanism at Meridian Magazine

    Distorting Transhumanism at Meridian Magazine
    2025/05/07
    Meridian Magazine positions itself as a publication for members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the largest Mormon denomination. I don’t know much about Meridian or the people behind it. But today I learned that they’re willing to publish a fear-mongering distortion of Transhumanism, “Human 2.0 Is Here — And You Didn’t Even Notice” by Alexis Tarkaleson. Despite their positioning, I wish to make make clear that such behavior is not aligned with the values that the Church advocates. Tarkaleson says “mind uploading” is an outlandish tale. What’s her take on tales of transfiguration and resurrection? Are those equally outlandish? Surely she’s aware that those doctrines require the possibility of mind (or spirit body) moving from one physical body to another, consistent with hypotheses of mind uploading. How about cryonics, yet another outlandish tale she identifies? I’m curious to know what she thinks about the Church’s advocacy to collect genealogy and preserve family history, with intent to facilitate redemption of the dead. And what about proxy rituals that we perform for the dead? Most of the world probably thinks the Church’s practices in these areas are at least as outlandish as those of cryonicists. What about “the god-like ‘posthuman’”? She says that’s outlandish too. Is she aware that Joseph Smith, the founding prophet of the Church, claimed that God “was once a man like us” in his last general conference sermon? If Joseph was right, as I trust, that would literally make God a posthuman. If these Transhumanist ambitions are merely “crazy sci-fi,” as Tarkaleson suggests, then the doctrines of the Church are crazy religious fiction. You see, the biggest difference between these ambitions isn’t their audacity, which detractors would disparage as mere fiction. Rather, the biggest difference is the narrative esthetic in which these ambitions are commonly expressed. Esthetics do matter, but not so much that we should willfully distort common underlying functions. Tarkaleson echoes someone else’s professed concern with Transhumanism’s “obsession” with anti-aging and perfectionism. That seems hypocritical coming from a member of a Church, in whose buildings one can hear, just about any Sunday, that human immortality is part of the work and glory of God. But Tarkaleson has bigger concerns with Transhumanism, she says. She identifies those concerns as “gender ideology,” “reproductive technology,” “abandonment of religion and family,” and “diminishing value of human life and human relationships.” Let’s look at what she says. Gender Ideology First, Tarkaleson addresses gender ideology. And she starts by criticizing a strawman of the concept of morphological freedom. She characterizes it as “unlimited freedom to transform your body … on a whim,” while mentioning but not fully taking into account the fact that most Transhumanists actually would limit that freedom to be “so long as it does not harm others.” I wonder if she doesn’t like the doctrine of agency, as advocated by Mormon scripture and the Church? Whether we like it or not, morphological freedom is a kind of agency. Tarkaleson says that Transhumanists have given morphological freedom “the ultimate position of sacredness by placement in the Transhuman Bill of Rights.” As it turns out, Mormon scripture has done functionally the same thing with the doctrine of agency. Our scriptures even go so far as to claim that Satan “sought to destroy the agency that God had given to His children.” Whose side is she on? To emphasize her concern with gender ideology, Tarkaleson aims her criticisms at two prominent Transhumanists. One is Martine Rothblatt, who is transgender. And the other is Fereidoun M. Esfandiary (FM2030), who advocated for androgyny and asexuality. Such Transhumanists are, Tarkaleson correctly points out, natural allies with the transgender movement. Yet some Transhumanists have concerns with how some expressions of the transgender movement have harmed others, going beyond the limits of morphological freedom. Some of us think gender is a blessing rather than a curse, and more likely to extend into than disappear from our posthuman future. And some of us know that secular persons and values are hardly the oldest forerunners of Transhumanism, which can actually trace its history back through deeply religious proto-Transhumanists and beyond to ancient religious analogs of Transhumanism. Reproductive Technology Next, Tarkaleson addresses reproductive technology. Here, she starts with asserting that Transhumanism finds its roots in birth control and abortion. This claim is absurd to the point of being stunning. The best evidence she can muster is a quote from a non-Transhumanist advocate of artificial reproduction. Tarkaleson says that Transhumanists cry out, “More, more, more,” as society speeds ahead with unethical reproductive technology...
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