Navigating the Vortex

著者： Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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  • We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

    www.navigatingthevortex.com
    Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means.

www.navigatingthevortex.com
Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
政治・政府 政治学 経済学
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  • All eyes on Putin again

    All eyes on Putin again
    2025/03/12
    By Tetyana Malyarenko & Stefan WolffOn March 11, 2025, senior US and Ukrainian officials reached an agreement on an American proposal for a thirty-day ceasefire in the war in Ukraine after nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties — Russia and Ukraine — has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the US ceasefire proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials.Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward.From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement — on hold since the shouting match between US president Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in the White House on February 28 — is back on, with Trump extending an invitation to Zelenskyy to return to Washington to sign it.Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia.Vladimir Putin … has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the strategically arguably more important goal of rapprochement with the United States.By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the strategically arguably more important goal of rapprochement with the United States.Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington, including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no NATO membership for Ukraine.These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia's isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country's economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is likely also keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.Putin is thus likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump.Putin is thus likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal had been announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American, let alone Ukrainian, terms. The Kremlin’s immediate reaction also lacked enthusiasm. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, noted that Moscow was still awaiting detailed information on what Kyiv and Washington had agreed. Both of these initial responses indicate a willingness to talk, but they also signal that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will very likely still require further negotiations.Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine — and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps — pressure on Ukraine and on Russia — are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defences to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the military balance of power, at ...
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    7 分
  • A coalition of the willing on European defence takes shape

    A coalition of the willing on European defence takes shape
    2025/03/08
    A week is a long time in politics, and with Donald Trump in the White House, it's even longer in international affairs. It has been eight days since the infamous shouting match on February 28 between Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky. Ever since, the near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine and the almost irreparable damage in the transatlantic relationship has become more of a certainty.Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5 saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.Neither of these two moves have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they will certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.Trump's manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine, it has also had a profound impact on Europe.So far, so bad. Yet Trump's manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine, it has also had a profound impact on the rest of Europe. On Sunday (March 2), in the immediate aftermath of the debacle in the White House, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London.Much like the French president, Emmanuel Macron, who had invited key European leaders after the insults delivered by the US vice president, JD Vance, at the Munich Security Conference earlier in February, Starmer hosted a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau. This "coalition of the willing" has been in the making for some time now and straddles the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including — apart from the UK — also non-EU members Norway and Turkey.Since the relatively disappointing first ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 — which was most notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent's role and place in a Trumpian world order — Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.The UK was first out of the tracks, announcing an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 on February 25, ahead of Starmer's visit to Washington. The British government then followed this up with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion on March 2. On March 6, Britain transferred £752 million — the first third of a £2.26 billion loan backed by profits from frozen Russian assets — to Ukraine for the purchase of military equipment.In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the "ReArm Europe Plan" on March 4 which is projected to mobilise around €800 billion for European defence. This includes a "national escape clause" exempting EU members' national defence expenditures from the EU's deficit rules, a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.And perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government, on March 5 confirmed a major shift in the country's fiscal policy that will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country's strict borrowing rules. This marks a critical point of departure for Germany not just in fiscal terms. It also sends an important political signal that Germany — the continent's largest economy — will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.These are all important steps. Provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are cumulatively likely to accelerate a European awakening. The challenges that Europe faces on the way to become strategically independent from the US are enormous, but they are not insurmountable. The conventional military threat posed by a revanchist and revisionist Russia is more easily manageable with the kinds of plans currently in the making. They are aimed to boost, among others, conventional forces, long-range missile strike and drone capabilities, and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will add critical war-fighting experience which can further enhance the deterrent effect of a European coalition of the willing.Europe, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities. Europe, however, remains ...
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    9 分
  • And the winner is…Vladimir Putin?

    And the winner is…Vladimir Putin?
    2025/03/04
    If there were international affairs Oscars in the category of biggest return for least investment, then the Russian president would have won hands down after the fiery blow-up between the US and Ukrainian presidents, Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, in the White House last Friday (February 28, 2025). The meeting itself would probably win in the category of most unexpected screenplay, given the astonishing shouting match between the two leaders.The rift deepened on Monday, with Mr Trump blasting Mr Zelensky for saying that the end of the war was still “very, very far away” when he should be “more appreciative” of US support. The White House also confirmed that Washington was pausing military aid to Ukraine.Does that now mean it’s all over for Zelenskyy? The minerals deal—initially floated by Ukraine and then eagerly embraced by Trump—certainly seems off, for now at least. And gone with it is any chance of an American security guarantee, however tenuous that might have been in the first instance. The only upside, if you can call it that, is that there is now absolute clarity that the United States under Donald Trump can no longer be relied upon as a partner when it comes to the future of Ukraine.Even if Zelensky and Trump can somehow miraculously mend their relationship, it is not clear whether any deal would be worth the mea culpa and additional concessions that would be required of Ukraine. Trump, after all, has made his own unpredictability—or maybe just his poorly disguised lack of self-control—a key feature of his approach to foreign policy.This is something worth bearing in mind in light of discussions that Ukraine may need a different leader, one more committed to peace than winning back lost territory, as Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz, suggested over the weekend. A different Ukrainian leader would still have to deal with the same US president, even though there may be less personal acrimony in their relationship.All eyes are now on Europe, where the near-certainty of fundamentally altered transatlantic relations seems to have finally sunk in. An urgently convened defence summit in London on Sunday (March 2, 2025) brought some concrete results, including a pledge from the UK to supply Ukraine with air defence missiles worth £1.6 billion. Plans for European security guarantees—provided by a “coalition of the willing” across the EU and NATO—are also beginning to take shape. A Special European Council on March 6, 2025, is likely to reveal further details on how much European leaders are willing to mobilise, and how soon.Funding these endeavours will still prove challenging. One avenue available to Europe remains seizing billions in frozen Russian assets, not just using the interest they generate. In Germany, where talks on forming a new grand coalition are under way following the country’s February 23 elections, there is talk of a €400 billion defence fund. Other options include a European rearmament bank and a common European defence fund, both built around the “coalition of the willing” and thus likely able to circumvent traditionally cumbersome EU decision making. Some of these efforts could also be kick-started by re-directing the €93 billion left in the EU’s COVID recovery fund. The surge in the share prices of major European defence contractors, including BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, and Rheinmetall, indicate that there is confidence in the private sector that European states will procure more military equipment. This, in turn, is likely to lead to more corporate investment in Europe’s defence industrial base in anticipation of higher sales and profits.Time is running out for both Ukraine and Europe. Trump’s deal with Putin might just be a deal that lifts American sanctions against Russia, cuts Ukraine off any US support, and limits, or perhaps even completely revokes, the US security guarantee to Europe through NATO and with it any effective deterrence against further Russian aggression. It may not come to this, at least not yet, but in light of how the Trump administration is treating all of its once-close allies and partners, such an outcome is now more than a far-flung and improbable scenario.For now, Putin may think that he can just sit back and enjoy the chaos. But part of what is likely to have led to the outbursts in the White House is the frustration that Trump has experienced in his relationship with the Kremlin. Moscow may not exactly be winning its war against Ukraine, but it is definitely not losing. The pace of territorial gains may have slowed over the past few weeks, but this might also just be the calm before the storm of a Russian spring offensive. In the meantime, daily Russian airstrikes, often involving hundreds of drones have continued unabated, damaging Ukrainian infrastructure and morale.The challenges that Ukraine and its European partners face are significant, but they are not insurmountable. A small ...
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    7 分

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